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DEPOSIT INSURANCE AND THE STOCK MARKET: EVIDENCE FROM DENMARK
Abstract
Previous studies of the relationship between deposit insurance and bank market values have
usually been limited to consideration of minor changes in bank regulations, but the 1987
initiation of deposit insurance in Denmark permits examination of a potentially major policy
shift.  We find that the market values of large Danish banks exhibited a modest positive
reaction to the announcement of insurance, but that small risky banks responded negatively.
These results partially contrast with those previously found for the United States, an outcome
that seems likely to reflect the interaction of deposit insurance with the particular
characteristics of the pre-existing Danish regulatory system.  
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1DEPOSIT INSURANCE AND THE STOCK MARKET: EVIDENCE FROM DENMARK
1.  INTRODUCTION
A fundamental question for banking researchers is whether deposit insurance has
wealth implications for bank stockholders.  The evidence to date, primarily from studies of
the United States (U.S.) banking system, suggests that shareholders of large or risky banks
benefit at the expense of those with holdings in smaller or more conservatively managed
institutions.  However, this conclusion is derived from observing incremental changes in the
U.S. system and, therefore, is of questionable generality for banks outside the U.S.1
A useful example of a more significant change in depositor protection policy is
provided by Denmark.  On 16 December 1987, the Danish Parliament legislated the adoption
of a new deposit insurance fund.  Prior to this date, the Danish banking authorities had
adopted a highly predictable merge-and-close policy with respect to troubled banks.  In
contrast to the U.S., Danish policy at that time consisted of a coordinated enforcement of
both minimum capital standards and a strict bank closure rule.2  In addition, Danish banks
employed a mark-to-market accounting system that enhanced outside monitoring by various
stakeholders.  As Pozdena (1992) notes, such a system was fundamentally different to that of
the U.S. and had resulted in an orderly disposition of weak banks at low cost to banking
authorities.
In this paper, we examine the stock market reaction of Danish banks to that
country’s introduction of deposit insurance.  We focus first on the banking sector as a whole,
as this reflects the market’s assessment of the likely adjustments in overall regulatory policy.
If the market expected no change in regulatory oversight, then the introduction of deposit
insurance may lower bank funding costs (see Bartholdy et al, 2003), but should otherwise have
                                                
1 For example, Duan et al (1992) are restricted to looking at the 1981 change in capital requirements in
their assessment of the role of deposit insurance in bank investment decisions.
2 Stover (1997) argues that the Early Resolution Program followed by the U.S. Resolution Trust
Corporation in the early 1990s accomplished a similar result, but only for a very limited number of
institutions.  As in Denmark, the RTC attempted to intervene while the failing institution still had
positive net worth.
2little impact and therefore induce only a small effect on the stockmarket value of the banking
sector.  By contrast, if Danish regulators were expected to adopt a more relaxed policy, then
bank shareholders should benefit, particularly if the insurance scheme contained implicit "too-
big-to-fail" provisions.   
Motivated by U.S. evidence showing that the wealth effects of changes in bank
regulatory policy can differ across banks, we also calculate the market reaction for various
bank sub-groups based on size and risk.3  If the introduction of deposit insurance was expected
to result in weaker regulatory oversight, then large banks and risky banks should gain the
most.  Large banks can take more risks, but are too big to be allowed to fail; risky banks not
only extract significant protection benefits, but also obtain additional opportunities to trade
their way out of financial difficulties. On the other hand, if no change in regulator behavior
was anticipated, then the gain to large banks should be less (because they cannot benefit from
more liberal oversight) while risky banks could potentially lose (because they no longer need
to be rescued in order to protect depositors).       
Using data from the 49 listed Danish banks, we find that the introduction of deposit
insurance had a modest positive impact on the market value of the Danish banking sector,
although this response is statistically significant only for large banks.  We also find that,
among small banks, the high-risk institutions experienced a negative reaction, a finding that
differs from conventional wisdom, but one that seems likely to reflect the nature of the pre-
existing Danish regulatory system and the expected response of this system to the presence of
a deposit insurance fund.  
In the next section we summarise the events leading up to the Danish adoption of
deposit insurance and identify the key events on which we subsequently focus.  Section 3
describes our data and outlines our hypotheses and methodology.  Section 4 contains our
results, while section 5 summarizes our findings and provides some concluding remarks.
                                                
3 For examples of the U.S. evidence, see O’Hara and Shaw (1990) and Cornett and Tehranian (1990).  
32. THE DANISH BANKING SYSTEM AND THE INTRODUCTION OF DEPOSIT
INSURANCE
The potentially negative effects of deposit insurance can be mitigated by other
aspects of bank regulatory policy.  Higher capital requirements force stockholders to bear
some of the risk of management decisions, while strict closure rules reduce the risk-taking
incentives offered by deposit insurance.4  However, when regulators fail to consistently
enforce bank discipline, problems can arise, e.g., the thrift institution crisis in the U.S. during
the later 1980s.  As Kane (1985) notes, the principal characteristics of the U.S. system during
that period - non risk-adjusted deposit insurance coupled with significant regulatory
forbearance - resulted in a shifting of wealth from small banks to large banks and from well-
capitalized institutions to risky institutions.  
Any examination of the introduction of deposit insurance in Denmark must therefore
be conditioned by the market perception of that country’s existing regulatory system.
Furthermore, any comparison of our results with those of other studies that have
concentrated on the U.S. banking system must also recognize the essential differences in the
two systems.  To facilitate such comparisons, and thus assist interpretation of our results, we
first describe the essential characteristics of the Danish regulatory system.
2.1  The Danish Regulatory System
During the post-World War II period, the Danish regulatory system has been
consistently predictable in its emphasis on capital adequacy and prompt closure of troubled
banks.  This approach was most recently mandated by the 1974 Commercial Banks and
Savings Banks Consolidated Act.  Under this Act, the Danish Inspectorate of Commercial and
Savings Banks (known as the Finanstilsynet) serves as the regulatory agency under the
auspices of the Ministry of Economics and Industry.  The latter has the power to both issue
and revoke bank charters.  In the late 1980s, this system required banks to maintain a
capital/assets ratio equal to 8% of total debt and guarantees.  If a bank’s capital ratio dropped
                                                
4 Studies that document these incentives include Duan et al (1992), Billett et al (1998), Pyle (1986),
Ronn and Verma (1986), Kane (1989), and Pennachi (1987).
4below this threshold, then part of its profits had to be diverted to a statutory reserve.  Failure
to satisfy these standards resulted in severe sanctions; at a 6% capital/assets ratio, the bank
had to seek additional capital from the markets.  If it could not do so, closure was imminent.
The effect of this system was to give weak banks an incentive to find a viable merger partner,
since the alternative was closure and loss of capital.  According to Pozdena (1992), the
Danish legal system both facilitated mergers and allayed any possible anti-trust objections.
Consequently, only one Danish bank had faced bankruptcy between the end of World War II
and 1987, the year when the deposit insurance proposal first emerged.
Complementing this rigid regulatory policy was Denmark’s use of mark-to-market
accounting.5 Danish financial institutions were required to provide for valuation adjustments
in their respective asset portfolios caused by interest rate, exchange rate, and credit risk
factors.  Such requirements were not trivial in that as much as 30% of Danish bank assets were
held in the form of stocks and bonds.  As a result, this feature of the Danish system not only
provided regulators with an effective means of assessing the risk of insolvency, but also
facilitated outside monitoring by shareholders and other stakeholders.
2.2  Deposit Insurance Legislation
Table 1 details the principal events leading up to the adoption of deposit insurance in
Denmark.  On 22 December 1986, the European Economic Community (EEC) recommended
that those member countries without a deposit insurance system establish such a programme.
While this proposal represented the EEC's official position, a summary did not appear in the
Danish press until 4 February 1987 when a summary was published in De Europæiske
Fællesskabers Tidende.  On 28 October 1987, after negotiations with various banking
organizations and the Danish Central Bank, the Ministry for Industry put forward a bill t o
Parliament for a Deposit-Guarantee Fund.
                                                
5 By contrast, financial institutions in the U.S. were principally required to produce historical-cost book
value statements.  Bernard et al (1995) detail how the two systems compare in the context of their
overall regulatory structures.  
5[Insert Table 1 About Here]
The bill proposed the establishment of a fund covering deposits of commercial banks,
savings banks, cooperative banks, and branches of foreign banks in Denmark, and certain
credit institutes with special authorization (e.g., banking houses) in the event of bankruptcy.
The financing of the program was to be based on deposits and, if needed, guarantees from the
covered financial institutions.  Each institution was to be assessed a maximum of two-tenths
of 1% of total deposits.  The proposal limited general deposit coverage to Kr. 250,000 with
exceptions promised for deposit accounts held for pension purposes, children’s savings
accounts, and certain other categories.  While discussion in Parliament focused on protecting
small depositors, the proposed system did not specify a maximum loss.  Thus, it provided de
facto total coverage of all depositors up to the Kr. 250,000 limit.  Finally, if the fund were
found to be inadequate to cover a larger bankruptcy, then the proposed regulations permitted
the fund to borrow to cover the shortfall.  The Danish government would guarantee such
loans.
3.  DATA AND EMPIRICAL HYPOTHESES
3.1  Data
We use daily stock returns of all 49 banks listed on the Københavns Fondsbørs,
henceforth referred to as the Copenhagen Stock Exchange (CSE), between 1 January 1986
and 22 March 1988.  These data were obtained from the Aarhus School of Business, as were
the daily return data for (i) the value-weighted index of all stocks listed on the CSE and (ii)
the value weighted index of all bank stocks listed on the CSE.  In addition, we obtained size
and ratio data for each bank from the 1987 Finanstilsynet annual report.
To allow for the possibility that the market reaction differed across banks, we create
size-based sub-samples of our bank stocks.  For this purpose, we use the three size groups
defined by the Finanstilsynet.  This categorization is based on a bank’s share of the banking
system’s total active capital (deposits + debt + equity) and distinguishes between banks as
follows:
6Large banks: at least 4% of active capital
Medium banks: between 0.3% and 4% of active capital
Small banks: no more than 0.3% of active capital
Table 2 provides some descriptive statistics for Danish banks during the sample
period.  At the end of 1987, the large banks in our sample were, on average, 13 times the size
of medium banks, which were, in turn, seven times as large as the small banks.  The mean
equity/asset ratios ranged from 5.9% for the large bank category to 11.5% for the smallest
banks.6  Similarly, small banks were the most profitable.  Shareholder returns were negative in
all categories during the sample period.
[Insert Table 2 About Here]
3.2  Hypotheses
The market response to the introduction of a new deposit insurance scheme seems
likely to depend primarily on its expected impact on regulator behaviour.   In particular, as
Podzena (1992) observes, a deposit insurance fund can buffer the pressure on bank regulators
and thus lead to less diligent monitoring of bank capital.  In the specific case of Denmark, the
introduction of deposit insurance provided Danish banking regulators with an opportunity t o
relax their former rigid merger-and-close policy.  Given the experience of other countries in
which deposit insurance co-existed with an often-slack regulatory policy, Danish investors
could reasonably anticipate that the deposit insurance fund would substitute for aggressive
regulation.  As a result, banks would be able to shift risk from themselves to taxpayers and
reap the benefits of the associated wealth transfer.  Thus, our first hypothesis is that the
introduction of deposit insurance was associated with an upward revision of banking sector
value.
                                                
6 Equity capital only is employed in the numerator of these ratios.  They should not be confused with the
total capital/assets ratio used in the Danish regulatory insolvency determination.  Banks are permitted to
use other liabilities in achieving the minimum regulatory capital requirements.
7Even if the introduction of deposit insurance had no effect on the banks in aggregate,
this leaves open the possibility that some banks gained while others lost.  For example,
O’Hara and Shaw (1990) suggest that the market reaction to changes in deposit insurance
coverage differs according to bank size because of the "too-big-to-fail" effect.  Similarly,
Cornett and Tehranian (1990) find that the 1982 passage of the Garn-St. Germain Depository
Institutions Act was associated with positive abnormal returns for large banks, but negative
abnormal returns for small banks.  In the Danish case considered here, large banks may be
expected to gain at the expense of small banks for two principal reasons.  First, the previous
merger-and-close policy required large banks to bail out troubled small banks. Although such
mergers had generally been undertaken on attractive terms to the acquiring bank, the risk
remained that at any future time a large bank could be required to rescue one or more small
banks at a significant financial cost.7  To the extent that the introduction of deposit
insurance suggested that troubled banks would be closed rather than merged, this risk was
reduced and large banks could be expected to benefit.  Second, the costs associated with the
deposit insurance scheme seemed likely to fall disproportionately on small banks.  For
example, if a large bank failed and additional fund borrowing was required to finance the
payout to depositors, then small banks could expect to bear part of the costs in the form of
higher future premiums.  By contrast, failure of a small bank would have only a negligible
effect on the future premiums of large banks.  Such an asymmetric imposition would,
moreover, be exacerbated by the implicit adoption of a “too-big-to-fail” provision in the
insurance scheme.  For these reasons, our second hypothesis is that the introduction of
deposit insurance was associated with a greater increase in the value of large banks.  
Deposit insurance also offers two opportunities for high-risk banks to gain relative t o
low-risk banks.  First, the bankruptcy protection benefits are more significant for the former,
thereby providing them with a greater reduction in the cost of deposits.  Second, to the extent
that the introduction of deposit insurance implied a more relaxed regulatory policy, then risky
banks could expect to be granted more latitude than previously and thereby benefit from
                                                
7 Indeed, discussions with market participants suggest that such fears were on the rise at this time due to
increased licensing of risky banks during the 1980s.
8increased opportunities to manage their way out of trouble. Thus, our final hypothesis is that
the introduction of deposit insurance was associated with a greater increase in the value of
high-risk banks than of low-risk banks.   
4.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS
To address our first hypothesis, we regress the daily bank index return on the market return
and on dummy variables corresponding to each event listed in Table 1.  That is, we estimate
Rt  =  α  +  βRmt  +  
8
Σ
k=1
  γk   Dkt  +  εt (1)
where
Rt =  day t return on the value-weighted index of Danish banking stocks
Rmt  =  day t return on the value-weighted Danish stock market index
Dkt  =  1 if day t corresponds to event k in Table 1, and 0 otherwise
and γk   denotes the abnormal return associated with event day k.   
Ordinary Least Squares estimation of equation (1) yields (t-statistics in parentheses)
Rt  =   -0.005  +  0.99Rmt  -  0.59D1t  +  0.13D2t  +  1.70D3t  -  0.25D4t
(0.22)   (40.0) (1.10) (0.24) (3.15) (0.47)
-  0.17D5t  -  0.01D6t  +  0.11D7t  -  0.06D8t Adj. R
2 = 0.74
(0.31) (0.01) (0.21) (0.11)
Although bank index returns are independent of most events leading to the adoption of
deposit insurance, the introduction on 28 October 1987 of the deposit insurance legislation t o
Parliament is associated with a 1.7% abnormal return that is significant at the 1% level.  This
provides some evidence that the introduction of deposit insurance was expected to benefit the
banking sector, consistent with our first hypothesis that the insurance fund might be used as a
substitute for diligent monitoring, thereby permitting banks to obtain risk-enhanced returns.
However, as discussed in the previous section, this aggregate effect may conceal considerable
inter-bank variations and it is to these issues that we now turn.
9To address our hypothesis regarding differential size-based effects, some refinement of
(1) is necessary.  In particular, since all our dependent variable data are drawn from firms in
the same industry, the error terms are likely to be correlated.  To overcome this problem, we
estimate the following system of seemingly unrelated regression equations:8
Rit  =  αi + βiRmt + βi1Rmt-1 + βi2Rmt-2 + 
8
Σ
k=1
  γik   Dkt + εit i = 1,2,3 (2)
where Rit is the day t stock return on portfolios i = 1 (large banks), 2 (medium banks), 3 (small
banks).  The lagged market returns are included to control for thin trading, particularly in
small banks.
The results from estimating (2) appear in Table 3.9  Consistent with our second
hypothesis, the positive aggregate reaction to the introduction of the deposit insurance
legislation to Parliament is entirely attributable to large banks.  While they experienced an
average abnormal return of 2.205% on that date, significant at the 1% level, the abnormal
returns for medium and small banks were insignificantly different from zero.10 This suggests
that the cost and risk changes associated with the deposit insurance scheme were expected t o
primarily benefit large banks.
[Insert Table 3 About Here]
Although there is no significant market reaction to any of the remaining events, there
remains the possibility that their cumulative effect may be non-zero.  To examine this
possibility, we calculate ∑
j=1
8
γik   for each size cohort and compare the differences between
                                                
8 For other examples of this approach in similar contexts, see Binder (1985), Cornett and Tehranian
(1990), and Wagster (1996).
9 These results are for one-day event dates.  Two-day returns yield similar findings.
10 A simple χ
2
 test confirms that the large-bank reaction was significantly greater than those of medium
and small banks.
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them using a test statistic that is asymptotically distributed as χ2 with one degree of freedom.
This yields
Large banks vs medium banks: χ2  =  1.833 (significant at 0.176 level)
Large banks vs small banks: χ2  =  2.871 (significant at 0.090 level)
Medium banks vs small banks: χ2  =  0.087 (significant at 0.768 level)
Thus, the cumulative effect of all eight events appears to have had no discernible differential
impact on large banks relative to medium banks, or on medium banks relative to small banks,
but had a marginally greater impact on large banks relative to small banks.  Again, this offers
some support for our hypothesis that large banks were expected to be the primary
beneficiaries of the deposit insurance scheme.11  
  As large banks are generally less risky than small banks, these results could also be
interpreted as implying that riskier banks were expected to benefit less from the introduction
of deposit insurance, contrary to conventional wisdom. To investigate this issue further, we
focus exclusively on our sub-sample of small banks (since it is amongst these that risk
differences are likely to be most apparent) and re-estimate equation (2) for i = 1  (high-risk
banks), 2 (medium-risk banks), 3 (low-risk banks).  Measurement of bank risk is a somewhat
fraught issue, but we categorise banks according to their capital ratios, since it was these that
were monitored by the Finanstilsynet.  Those banks with capital ratios in the lower third of
our sample are defined as high risk; those in the middle third as medium risk; and those in the
upper third as low risk.   
Table 4 presents the results of this analysis.  Surprisingly, insofar as it contradicts our
third hypothesis, the high-risk banks responded negatively to events two (the first publication
of the EEC recommendation) and four (the first parliamentary debate) with abnormal returns
                                                
11 As the first debate of the legislation on 3 November 1987 indicated a clear majority in favour, it seems
possible that the market viewed approval as a foregone conclusion after this date.  We therefore re-
estimate equations (1) and (2) excluding the last four events in Table 1, and obtain similar qualitative
results.  However, the difference between large and small banks becomes significant at the 5% level.
Similarly, the distinction between high-risk banks and medium/low-risk banks in Table 4 becomes
statistically more robust, but is otherwise unaffected.       
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of -2.52% and -2.28%, respectively, both significant at the 5% level.  By contrast, neither
low-risk nor medium-risk banks responded significantly to any event.12  
[Insert Table 4 About Here]
Analysis of the cumulative effect of all eight events again yields similar results
High-risk versus medium-risk banks: χ2  =  5.045 (significant at 0.025 level)
High-risk versus low-risk banks: χ2  =  2.777 (significant at 0.096 level)
Medium-risk versus low-risk banks: χ2  =  0.038 (significant at 0.846 level)
That is, the stock market reaction to the cumulative impact of the deposit insurance
legislation was significantly more negative for high-risk small banks than for other small
banks.  
Overall, these findings suggest that high-risk banks were expected to be adversely
affected by the introduction of deposit insurance.  This result is at odds with our third
hypothesis and seems particularly interesting, in that it contradicts both the conventional
wisdom that greater deposit insurance coverage primarily benefits riskier banks, and the U.S.
evidence of O’Hara and Shaw (1990) supporting this view.  
There are two possible reasons for this unexpected outcome, both of which relate t o
the interaction between deposit insurance and the prior Danish regulatory policy.  First, as
discussed earlier, deposit insurance allows regulators to force bank shareholders to endure the
consequences of failure, since failing banks no longer need to be rescued in order to protect
depositors.13  Thus, the introduction of deposit insurance would be associated with greater
downside risk for bank shareholders.   
Second, the previous merger-and-close policy had permitted early identification of
troubled banks, so any required mergers had usually occurred while the acquired bank retained
                                                
12 Again, a χ
2
 test indicates that the reaction among high-risk banks on each of these dates is significantly
more negative than those of medium-risk and low-risk banks.
13 Indeed, the original scheme explicitly prohibited the deposit insurance fund from rescuing troubled
banks.  A subsequent law change allowed regulators to undertake rescue in circumstances where
payment of insurance to depositors would be more expensive.
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some positive net worth.  Consequently, shareholders of the acquired banks generally emerged
with positive equity.  By contrast, if a deposit insurance scheme resulted in regulators adopting
a less rigorous closure policy, thereby allowing troubled institutions to deteriorate further, the
eventual liquidation payment to shareholders would be correspondingly reduced.  Thus, to the
extent that the substitution of deposit insurance for merger-and-close lowered the probability
of regulator intervention, there would be a higher shareholder loss in those states where
intervention eventually became necessary.  For low-risk and medium-risk banks, this
possibility was of little consequence, but it had potentially adverse consequences for high-risk
banks.  In short, the previous merger-and-close policy provided a mechanism for rescuing the
shareholders of troubled banks, but the introduction of deposit insurance raised the possibility
that this mechanism might disappear.    
5.  CONCLUSION
Previous empirical research focusing on the role of deposit insurance in a banking
system has primarily concentrated on relatively minor alterations in the U.S. scheme.  While
providing important insight into the managerial effects of that insurance system, such
research has been severely limited in its ability to draw generalizable conclusions.  The Danish
decision to incorporate deposit insurance into a banking system known for mark-to-market
accounting and a rigid bank closure procedure provides an opportunity to examine a major
change in bank regulation.
Based on the fundamental principle that the market reaction to such a change will
reflect its impact on regulator behaviour, we develop three hypotheses.  First, because the
introduction of deposit insurance offered the potential for lower funding costs and relaxed
regulatory oversight, bank share prices should rise.  Second, because large banks reaped the
greatest benefits while incurring fewer costs, their share prices should rise by more than those
of smaller banks.  Third, because of greater bankruptcy protection benefits, high-risk banks
should gain more than low-risk banks.  The results of our analysis support the first two
hypotheses, but not the third.  In fact, high-risk Danish banks suffered a negative price
reaction to the events leading up to the adoption of deposit insurance, a result that contrasts
13
with studies of the U.S. system where the general conclusion has been that deposit insurance
benefits the more risky banks.  This seems likely to reflect the interaction between deposit
insurance and the Danish regulatory system, thereby suggesting that arguments concerning
deposit insurance systems must be made in the context of a country’s overall regulatory
structure.
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Table 1.  Events leading to the establishment of the Danish Deposit Insurance System
Event Date Description
1 December 22, 1986 European Economic Community (EEC) suggests that all
member countries should have financial institution deposit
insurance
2 February 4, 1987 First date the EEC suggestion was published in De
Europæiske Fællesskabers Tidende
3 October 28, 1987 Deposit insurance legislation introduced to Danish
Parliament
4 November 3, 1987 Legislation first debated in Parliament and referred to
standing committee with responsibility for banking
legislation
5 December 3, 1987 Standing committee reports back
6 December 10, 1987 Second debate and standing committee recommendations
are approved
7 December 16, 1987 Parliament passes the legislation with 116 members for it
and 10 against
8 February 25, 1988 The deposit insurance law goes into effect
Source:  M. Holm-Nielsen and B. W. Fogh (1989).
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Table 2.  Descriptive Statistics for Danish banks:  This table shows means and
standard deviations (in parentheses) of variables describing the 49 banks in our sample.
Size and ratio data are for the year ending 31 December 1987.  Daily shareholder returns
are calculated for the period 1 January 1986 to 22 March 1988.  Large banks are those
with at least 4% of the system’s active capital; medium banks have between 0.3% and 4%;
small banks have less than 0.3%.
Variable Large Banks Medium Banks Small Banks
Asset Size 83.51 6.60 0.89
(billion Danish Kr) (39.59) (5.45) (0.50)
Equity/Assets 5.90 7.80 11.5
(%) (0.20) (3.00) (11.72)
Advances/Deposits 89.10 108.40 93.10
(%) (11.00) (18.50) (18.10)
Net Income/Revenues 2.86 3.67 4.26
(%) (0.42) (8.80) (6.50)
Shareholder Returns -0.05 -0.04 -0.04
(%) (1.45) (2.01) (2.53)
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Table 3.  Abnormal returns of banks on dates leading to the establishment of the
Danish deposit insurance system:  Size effects.  This table reports the abnormal returns
for size-based sub-samples of Danish banks at each of the eight events in which a documented
step was made towards introduction of deposit insurance.  t–statistics are in parentheses; ***
denotes significance at the .01 level.  For a description of the size categorizations, see Table
2.
Abnormal Returns
Events Large Medium Small
Size Size Size
1.  EEC suggest deposit insurance  0.307 -0.901 -0.548
(0.466) (1.195) (1.023)
2. EEC suggestion published  0.384   0.477 -0.716
(0.581) (0.633) (1.334)
3. Insurance legislation introduced  2.205***  1.012 0.150
to Parliament (3.315) (1.333) (0.278)
4. First parliamentary debate -0.065 0.278 -0.487
(0.100) (0.369) (0.911)
5. Committee report -0.380 -0.258 0.185
(0.577) (0.343) (0.346)
6. Committee recommends approval 0.001 0.349 -0.422
(0.002) (0.464) (0.789)
7. Parliament passes insurance 0.188 0.262 -0.327
regulation (0.286) (0.348) (0.613)
8. Law goes into effect -0.081 -0.019 0.021
(0.124) (0.025) (0.040)
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Table 4.  Abnormal returns of small banks on dates leading to the establishment of
the Danish deposit insurance system:  Risk effects.  This table reports the abnormal
returns for risk-based sub-samples of small Danish banks at each of the eight events in which a
documented step was made towards introduction of deposit insurance.  t-statistics are in
parentheses; ** denotes significance at the .05 level.  High-risk banks are those with capital
ratios in the lower third of our sample; those in the middle third are medium-risk; and those in
the upper third are low-risk.
Abnormal Returns
High Medium Low
Risk Risk Risk
1. EEC suggest deposit insurance -0.700 0.412 -1.295
(0.823) (0.569) (1.422)
2. EEC suggestion published -2.524** -0.283 0.554
(2.907) (0.394) (0.604)
3. Insurance legislation introduced -0.973 1.128 0.283
to Parliament (1.112) (1.556) (0.307)
4. First parliamentary debate -2.275** -0.469 1.146
(2.645) (0.652) (1.257)
5. Committee report 0.290 -0.068 0.321
(0.338) (0.095) (0.353)
6. Committee recommends approval -0.343 -0.293 -0.614
(0.399) (0.407) (0.673)
7. Parliament passes insurance -0.064 -0.100 -0.780
regulation (0.075) (0.140) (0.858)
8. Law goes into effect 0.287 -0.169 -0.048
(0.335) (0.236) (0.053)
